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FRACK ATTACKS: GOVERNMENT COMPLIANCE -- OR LACK
THEREOF -- WITH FEDERAL REGULATIONS ON TRIBAL LANDS
Hayes v. Chaparral Energy, LLC1
I. INTRODUCTION
Fracking is a technique used in oil and gas drilling that involves
using large amounts of water, sand, and chemicals to extract fuel from the
ground.2 Fracking is more common today than it has been in the past,
including on Indian lands. Because Indian lands are held in trust by the
federal government, tribes have less discretion as to what to do with their
lands than if the lands were privately held. While environmental effects
must be considered, tribes generally benefit from royalties on oil and gas
mining leases for fracking purposes. However, Bureau of Indian Affairs
(“BIA”) mismanagement has caused tribes to miss out on tens of millions
of dollars in energy development opportunities.3 Some tribes rely heavily
Hayes v. Chaparral Energy, LLC, 2016 WL 1254427 (N.D. Okla. 2016), appeal filed
sub nom Hayes v. Osage Minerals, et al. (10th Cir. May 24, 2016).
2
Rita Ann Cicero, Judge Blocks New Rule for Fracking on Public Lands, 36 NO. 6
WESTLAW J. ENVTL. 3, at *1 (Oct. 14, 2015).
3
Michael Bastasch, Obama Allows Indians To Grow Pot, But Not Drill For Oil On their
Own Lands, THE DAILY CALLER NEWS FOUNDATION (Oct. 8, 2015, 1:18 PM),
http://dailycaller.com/2015/10/08/obama-allows-indians-to-grow-pot-but-not-drill-foroil-on-their-own-lands/. Opportunities involve both green energy and fossil fuels. Id.
1
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on oil and gas revenues.4 This note examines a case indicating that the
BIA’s mismanagement has been harmful, particularly in Osage County,
Oklahoma. Hayes is the first of its kind to invalidate a federal lease and
drilling permits approved by the BIA because of failure to comply with the
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1872, Congress established a reservation for the Osage Nation5
in Oklahoma.6 In 1904 and 1905, large quantities of oil and gas were
discovered on the reservation.7 Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted the
Osage Allotment Act,8 placing the mineral estate underlying the Osage
lands in trust and directing the Secretary of the Interior to collect and
distribute royalty income to tribal members on a quarterly, pro rata basis.9

Id.
Barbara Moschovidis, Osage Nation v. Irby: The Tenth Circuit Disregards Legal
Precedent to Strip Osage County of its Reservation Status, 36 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 189,
191 (2012). In 1870, the federal government removed the Osage from Kansas, sold the
land, and used the proceeds to purchase land from the Cherokee. Id.
6
Hayes, 2016 WL 1254427, at *1; see Act of June 5, 187217 Stat. 228 (1871) (“An Act
to confirm to the Great and Little Osage Indians a Reservation in the Indian Territory.”).
7
Hayes, 2016 WL 1254427, at *1.
8
Act of June 28, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-321, 34 Stat. 539 (1905).
9
Id. The government’s trusteeship over the mineral estate was originally set to last
twenty-five years but has been extended in perpetuity. Hayes, 2016 WL 1254427, at *1
(citing Pub. L. No. 95-496, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 1660 (1978)).
4
5
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Osage Nation may lease portions of the mineral estate for
exploration and development with the Secretary of the Interior’s approval,
under such rules and regulations as she may prescribe.10 The Secretary of
the Interior has delegated that approval authority to the Superintendent of
the Osage Agency within the Bureau of Indian Affairs.11 No operations are
permitted upon any tract of land until the Superintendent approves a lease
covering the tract.12 To commence drilling, a lessee must obtain additional
approval from the Superintendent.13 The Superintendent’s approval of
leases and drilling permits on Osage lands constitutes federal action
subject to NEPA.14
NEPA is a process-oriented statute requiring federal agencies to
consider the environmental impact of their actions.15 This dispute involves
the government’s obligations under NEPA with regard to approval of an
oil and gas lease and two drilling permits in Osage County, Oklahoma.16
In 1978, the District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma entered a
2016 WL 1254427, at *1 (citing 1906 Act § 3).
Id. (citing 25 C.F.R. §§ 226.4, 226.5(b) (2014)).
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id. at *2.
15
Id. at *1.
16
Id.
10
11
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judgment ordering the Secretary of the Interior and the Superintendent of
the Osage Agency to prepare an Environmental Assessment.17 The
Assessment covered the effects of oil and gas operations under oil mining
leases, gas mining leases, oil and gas mining leases, drilling permits, water
use authorizations, and other documents the Secretary used relating to oil
and gas operations on the land in Osage County.18
In 1979, the Osage Agency issued the Environmental Assessment,
evaluating all aspects of its oil and gas leasing program in Osage
County.19 The Assessment provided a detailed explanation of the leasing
program, a description of the county’s existing and likely future
environmental conditions, and an evaluation of the leasing program’s
actual or potential environmental impacts.20 The Assessment also
described drilling techniques and practices within the county, briefly
mentioning fracking.21 The Assessment ultimately concluded that the
leasing program would not have a significant impact on the human

Id. at *2.
Id.
19
Id. at *3.
20
Id.
21
Id.
17
18
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environment.22 Notably, the projections in the Assessment were limited to
the year 2000.23 Based on the Assessment’s findings, the Osage Agency
issued a Finding of No Significant Impact (“FONSI”).24
In January 2013, Chaparral entered into an oil and gas lease with
Osage Nation for a 160-acre portion of the Osage mineral estate
underlying Plaintiff Hayes’s property.25 Then, the BIA approved the
lease.26 The BIA determined that its approval fell within the exception for
mineral lease adjustment and transfer approval, which includes
assignments and subleases.27 In April 2014, Chaparral submitted a drilling
permit application to the BIA, and the BIA approved the application.28
In May 2014, Chaparral submitted an amended drilling permit
application, moving the proposed well site 100 feet to the west.29 The BIA
approved the amended application but did not prepare a new NEPA
document, supplement, tier to, incorporate, or otherwise explicitly adopt

Id.
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
22
23

110

the 1979 Assessment’s analysis.30 In August 2014, Hayes brought suit
against the United States, the Department of the Interior, the BIA, and
Chaparral under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),31 alleging the
government’s approval of the lease and the original and amended drilling
permits failed to comply with NEPA.32 When a government agency fails
to comply with NEPA before approving lease and drilling permits, then
those lease and drilling permits will be declared void from the beginning.33
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A.

The Administrative Procedure Act

The APA was enacted in 1946 and governs federal agency
action.34 An “agency” is an authority of the federal government, 35 and
“agency action” includes an agency rule, order, or failure to act.36 Final
agency actions are subject to judicial review.37 A person suffering legal
wrong or adverse effects because of an agency action is entitled to judicial

Id.
5 U.S.C § 551 et seq. (2012).
32
Hayes, 2016 WL 1254427, at *4.
33
Id. at *1. This holding has since been superseded so that failure to comply with NEPA
renders lease approvals invalid. Id.
34
5 U.S.C. § 551 (2012).
35
Id. There are some exceptions. See id. § 551(1).
36
§ 551(13).
37
§ 704.
30
31
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review.38 An agency’s action may be overturned if a court determines the
action was arbitrary and capricious.39 Agency action is arbitrary and
capricious if the agency (1) failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem; (2) offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or agency expertise;40 (3) failed to base its
decision on consideration of the relevant factors; or (4) made a clear error
of judgment.41
B.
The National Environmental Policy Act and Council on
Environmental Quality Regulations
NEPA was enacted in 1970 and aims to avoid uninformed
decision-making on environmental issues by requiring agencies to gather
and document information concerning environmental impacts of that
agency’s actions.42 NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare
Environmental Impact Statements before taking any major federal actions
that could significantly affect the quality of the human environment. 43 If
§ 702.
§ 704.
40
Jagers v. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp., 758 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 2014).
41
Utah Envt’l Cong. v. Troyer, 479 F.3d 1269, 1280 (10th Cir. 2007).
42
See Lee v. U.S. Air Force, 354 F.3d 1229, 1237 (10th Cir. 2004).
43
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(ii) (2012).
38
39
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an agency is uncertain whether an Environmental Impact Statement is
required, it may elect to prepare a less-detailed Environmental
Assessment.44 NEPA ensures the agency will only reach a decision on a
proposed action after carefully considering environmental impacts of the
proposed action.45
Federal agencies are required to prepare an Environmental
Assessment for any proposed action unless: (1) the agency has elected or
is otherwise required to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement; or
(2) the agency action is subject to a categorical exclusion.46 If, after
preparing an Environmental Assessment, the agency concludes that a
proposed action will not significantly affect the environment, the agency
may issue a FONSI and does not need to prepare a full Environmental
Impact Statement.47 Agency action can be either broad or specific.48 Broad
agency action includes adopting official policies, plans, or programs.

Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 145 (2010).
Forest Guardians v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 611 F.3d 692, 717 (10th Cir. 2010).
46
40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.3, 1501.4(a), (b) (2014).
47
McKeen v. U.S. Forest Serv., 615 F.3d 1244, 1248 n.3 (10th Cir. 2010).
48
40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b) (2014).
44
45
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Specific agency action includes approving specific projects. 49 Both broad
and specific agency actions require compliance with NEPA.50
An Environmental Assessment allows the agency to consider
environmental concerns while reserving agency resources.51 An Impact
Statement is a detailed document that identifies the potential impacts a
proposal may have on the environment.52 When available, agencies are
encouraged to use existing analyses for assessing the impacts of a
proposed action and any alternatives.53 Supplementing, tiering to,
incorporating by reference, or adopting previous Assessments are all
acceptable methods for using existing analyses.54
The Council on Environmental Quality is tasked with interpreting
NEPA and establishing regulations governing agencies’ responsibilities

Id.
Id.
51
Park City Res. Council v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 817 F.2d 609, 621 (10th Cir. 1987),
overruled on other grounds by Vill. of Los Ranchos De Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d
970 (10th Cir. 1992).
52
Citizens’ Comm. to Save Our Canyons v. U.S. Forest Serv., 297 F.2d 1012, 1022 (10th
Cir. 2002).
53
43 C.F.R. § 46.120(a) (2014).
54
Id. at §§ 46.120(d), 46.135, 46.140; 1502.20, 1508.28 (Tiering is a procedure in which
an agency may incorporate statements from an existing broader Environmental Impact
Statement to provide analysis for a subsequent, narrower NEPA document. Tiering is
appropriate when the sequence of analyses is from a program, plan, or policy
Environmental Impact Statement to a site-specific analysis).
49
50
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under NEPA.55 The Council on Environmental Quality’s regulations
require federal agencies to adopt further procedures identifying specific
actions which either normally require an Impact Statement or are
categorically excluded.56 The Department of the Interior’s supplemental
NEPA regulations permit it and its constituent bureaus to use an existing
Environmental Assessment in its entirety if the agency determines, with
appropriate supporting documentation, that the Assessment adequately
appraises the environmental effects of the proposed action and reasonable
alternatives.57 An agency must supplement an Impact Statement or
Assessment if there are significant new circumstances or information
relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or
its impacts.58 Generally, if a programmatic NEPA document is more than
five years old, it should be carefully reexamined to determine whether
supplementation is necessary.59

Sierra Club, Inc. v. Bostick, 787 F.3d 1043, 1063 (10th Cir. 2015).
40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(a) (2014).
57
43 C.F.R. § 46.120(c) (2014).
58
§ 1502.9(c)(1)(ii). See S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Norton, 301 F.3d 1217, 1238 n.19
(10th Cir. 2002), rev’d on other grounds, 542 U.S. 55 (2004).
59
Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act
Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,036 (Mar. 23, 1981). Other courts in the Tenth
Circuit have considered this source when interpreting and implementing NEPA
regulations. See Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1125, 1125 n.17 (10th Cir. 2002), abrogated
55
56
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Because NEPA is procedural and does not provide a right of
action, a court will review an agency’s project approval, including
compliance with NEPA, under the APA.60 The court will not set aside the
agency’s decision unless the decision fails to meet statutory, procedural, or
constitutional requirements, or unless the decision is an abuse of
discretion, arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with the
law.61
C.
Precedent

Supreme Court of the United States and Tenth Circuit

The Secretary of the Interior has the authority to ratify or reject
leases relating to Indian lands.62 Environmental analyses aid agencies in
determining what course of action should be taken in each situation.63
NEPA applies to all federal agencies, including the BIA. 64 Government
approval of a project is the only involvement necessary to constitute major
federal action.65 In Davis, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the District of New

by Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell, 839 F.3d 1276 (10th Cir. 2016).
60
Morris v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 598 F.3d 677, 690 (10th Cir. 2010).
61
Sac & Fox Nation of Mo. v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1250, 1260 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)).
62
Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 595, 595 (10th Cir. 1972).
63
Id. at 596.
64
Id. at 598 (citing Nat’l Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.3d 650 (10th Cir. 1971)).
65
Id. at 597.
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Mexico had erred in holding that a lease to a development company, on
the Tesuque Indian Reservation in Santa Fe County, did not constitute
major federal action.66 Davis held that just because Indian lands are held
in trust does not take lease approval out of NEPA’s jurisdiction.67 So,
unless another statute’s obligations are clearly mutually exclusive from
NEPA’s mandates, NEPA’s specific requirements remain in force.68
Therefore, the Department’s initial lease approval was invalid because the
requisite environmental study did not precede the lease approval.69
Department of Interior approval is required for a lease on federal
lands to be valid.70 An agency’s failure to comply with NEPA before
approving a lease on federal lands renders the agency’s lease approval
invalid.71 In Sangre, the development company from Davis alleged it had
a vested interest protected under the Fifth Amendment at the time the
alleged taking occurred, and the Department of the Interior rescinding its
lease approval constituted a “taking” under the Fifth Amendment. 72 The
Id. at 596.
Id. at 597.
68
Id.
69
Sangre de Cristo Dev. Co. v. U.S., 932 F.2d 891, 894 (10th Cir. 1991).
70
Id. at 894.
71
Id. at 894-95.
72
Id. at 894. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. V.
66
67
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Tenth Circuit held 25 U.S.C. § 415(a) requires a valid approval from the
Department of the Interior in order for the lease contract to have legal
effect, so the invalid lease contract between Sangre and the Pueblo vested
no property interest in Sangre.73 Therefore, Sangre could not have been
divested of a leasehold interest because Sangre’s interest never vested in
the first place.74
Categorical exclusions influence whether an agency must prepare
an environmental analysis for a particular action.75 Once an agency
establishes categorical exclusions, its decision to classify a proposed
action as falling within a particular categorical exclusion will be set aside
only if a court determines that the decision was arbitrary and capricious. 76
In Citizens’ Committee, the Forest Service concluded an interchange of
public and private lands fell within a categorical exclusion exempting land
exchanges from NEPA review “where resulting land uses remain
essentially the same.”77 Even though the public land was relatively
Sangre, 932 F.2d at 895.
Id.
75
Citizens’ Comm. to Save Our Canyons v. U.S. Forest Serv., 297 F.3d 1012, 1023 (10th
Cir. 2002).
76
Id. (citing Friends of Richards-Gebaur v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 251 F.3d 1178, 1187
(8th Cir. 2001)).
77
Id. at 1023-24 (quoting Forest Serv. Handbook 1909.15 § 31.1b(7)). The interchange
73
74
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undeveloped, the Forest Service noted the public land was already subject
to skiing activity; therefore transferring ownership would not alter its
essential use or character.78 The Tenth Circuit concluded the Forest
Service did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when the Forest Service
concluded the activity on the federal lands exchanged in the interchange
would remain essentially the same.79
Courts perform a two-part test to determine whether the agency
should have supplemented its Environmental Impact Statement or
Environmental Assessment.80 First, the court will look to see if the agency
took a “hard look” at the new information to determine whether
supplemental analysis was necessary.81 Courts may consider whether the
agency obtained expert opinions, gave careful scientific scrutiny,
responded to all legitimate concerns raised, or otherwise provided a
reasoned explanation for the new circumstance’s lack of significance.82

involved public land and a ski resort. Id. at 1012.
78
Id. at 1024.
79
Id.
80
S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Norton, 301 F.3d 1217, 1238 (10th Cir. 2002), rev’d on
other grounds, 542 U.S. 55 (2004).
81
Id. (citing Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., Medford Dist., 914 F.2d 1174,
1177 (9th Cir. 1990)).
82
Id. (citing Hughes River Watershed Conservancy v. Johnson, 165 F.3d 283, 288 (4th
Cir. 1999)).
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Second, if the court determines the agency took the hard look, the court
then reviews the agency’s decision not to issue a supplemental
Environmental Assessment or Impact Statement under the APA’s arbitrary
and capricious standard.83
In S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, the Wilderness Alliance
challenged the Bureau of Land Management, and the Tenth Circuit
remanded the case to the District of Utah to determine whether the Bureau
of Land Management had failed to take a hard look at information
suggesting off-road vehicle use in the disputed areas had substantially
increased since the environmental analyses were issued.84 The Supreme
Court of the United States determined evidence of increased off-road
vehicle use did not require the Bureau of Land Management to take a hard
look at the need to supplement its Environmental Impact Statement.85 The
Supreme Court of the United States reiterated supplementation is only
required if major federal action remains to be taken.86 Although approving
a land use plan is a major federal action requiring an Impact Statement, the
Id. (citing Marsh v. Or. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989)).
Id. at 1240. The challenged analyses were dated from 1990, 1991, 1980, and 1985. Id.
at 1237 n.18.
85
Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 55 (2004).
86
Id. at 73 (citing Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374 (1989)).
83
84
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action is completed when the plan is approved.87 So, there was no ongoing
major federal action that required supplementation at the time, although
the Bureau of Land Management would be required to perform additional
analysis if a plan is amended or revised.88
Categorical exclusions promote efficiency in the NEPA review
process.89 By definition, a categorical exclusion does not create a
significant environmental effect, so analyses do not need to be performed
unless there are extraordinary circumstances.90 A court may reject the
agency’s interpretation of its categorical exclusions only when the
interpretation is unreasonable, plainly erroneous, or inconsistent with the
exclusion’s plain meaning.91 In Bosworth, the Utah Environmental
Congress argued the Forest Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously by
authorizing the Seven Mile Project pursuant to a categorical exclusion.92
The Tenth Circuit first looked at the exclusion’s plain meaning, then
determined that the Forest Service previously did the extensive
Id. (citing 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-6 (2003)).
Id. (citing §§ 1610.5-5, 5-6 (2003)).
89
Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Bosworth, 443 F.3d 732, 742 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Fund for
Animals v. Babbitt, 89 F.3d 128, 130 (2d Cir. 1996)).
90
Id. at 741 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2003)).
91
Id. at 740 (quoting Bar MK Ranches v. Yuetter, 994 F.2d 735, 738 (10th Cir. 1993)).
92
Id.
87
88
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environmental analysis in creating the categorical exclusion.93 Thus, to
require monitoring, documentation, and review of data that do not trigger
extraordinary circumstances would defeat the categorical exclusions’
purpose.94 So, according to the Tenth Circuit, the Seven Mile Project was
in compliance with the APA and NEPA.95
Questions may arise when there is a broad agency action followed
by a narrower, site-specific action.96 If an agency adopts an official
program and, in furtherance thereof, later approves a specific project, the
agency ordinarily must prepare a separate Environmental Assessment or
Impact Statement for both actions.97 In Richardson, the parties disputed
over how the natural gas drilling environmental analysis in the broad plan
should be tiered.98 The Tenth Circuit held it was clear from the record the
Company had concrete plans to build thirty natural gas wells on the land,
and the Company had obtained the permits for a gas pipeline, so the
environmental impacts of the planned gas field were reasonably
Id. at 750 (citing Colo. Wild. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 435 F.3d 1204, 1210 (10th Cir.
2006)).
94
Id.
95
Id. at 753.
96
New Mexico ex rel. Richardson v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 565 F.3d 683, 688 (10th
Cir. 2009).
97
Id. at 703.
98
Id. at 716.
93
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foreseeable before the specific lease was issued.99 Thus, NEPA required
analysis of the lease’s site-specific impacts prior to issuance, and the
Bureau of Land Management acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing
to conduct one.100
Courts distinguish between broad agency action followed by a
specific project, like in Richardson, and merely a broad agency action. An
agency may not be required to include a site-specific analysis of every
area a broad agency action affects.101 The Tenth Circuit has held neither
NEPA nor the Council on Environmental Quality regulations require an
agency to include a site-specific analysis for every particular area a
proposed action affects.102 Wyoming involves a challenge to the Forest
Service’s adoption of a nationwide rule prohibiting road construction and
certain other activities on lands within the national forest system
designated as road-less areas.103 Wyoming asserted the Forest Service’s
Environmental Impact Statement for the proposed rule violated NEPA
because it failed to include a site-specific analysis of every area the rule
Id. at 718.
Id. at 718-19.
101
Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 661 F.3d 1209, 1254 (10th Cir. 2011).
102
Id. at 1255.
103
Id. at 1222.
99

100
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affects.104 The Tenth Circuit held broad agency action alone does not
require site-specific environmental analysis.105
Neither NEPA nor the APA requires reversal for trivial errors.106
Even if an agency violates the APA, its error does not require reversal
unless a plaintiff demonstrates prejudice resulting from the error.107
Deficiencies in environmental analyses that do not defeat NEPA’s
informed decision-making goals will not lead to reversal.108 In Hillsdale,
several groups brought challenges to a dredge and fill permit the Army
Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) issued under the Clean Water Act and
NEPA.109 The District of Kansas granted summary judgment for the
Corps, and Hillsdale appealed, alleging the Corps failed to prepare an
adequate Environmental Assessment and failed to prepare a full Impact

Id. at 1254.
Id. at 1256.
106
See Hillsdale Envtl. Loss Prevention, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 702 F.3d
1156, 1165 (10th Cir. 2012).
107
Id. (quoting Prairie Band Pottawatomie Nation v. Fed. Highway Admin., 684 F.3d
1002, 1008 (10th Cir. 2012)).
108
Id. (quoting New Mexico ex rel. Richardson v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 565 F.3d 683,
704 (10th Cir. 2009)).
109
Id. at 1162.
104
105
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Statement.110 The Tenth Circuit concluded the record supported the Corps’
decision, and the decision was not arbitrary and capricious.111
Even though courts give agencies tremendous deference in many
aspects, a court will reject an agency’s interpretation of a categorical
exclusion when the interpretation is based on a legal conclusion
inconsistent with the exclusion’s plain meaning. When a lease requires
agency approval to be legally operative and a court determines the agency
approved such a lease in violation of NEPA, the determination necessarily
invalidates the underlying lease unless or until valid agency approval.112
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, Plaintiff challenges the BIA’s approval of the
Chaparral lease and drilling permits for failure to comply with NEPA.113
The BIA responds that its lease approval fell within a categorical
exclusion, and the 1979 Environmental Assessment and Finding of No
Significant Impact covered its approval of the drilling permits.114

Id.
Id.
112
Hayes v. Chaparral Energy, LLC, No. 14-CV-495-GKF-PJC, 2016 WL 1175238, at
*10 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 23, 2016).
113
Id. at *4.
114
Id. at *2.
110
111

125

Once an agency establishes categorical exclusion, its decision to
classify a proposed action as falling within a particular categorical
exclusion will be set aside only if a court determines the agency’s decision
was arbitrary and capricious.115 So, the court must give substantial
deference to the agency’s interpretations of its own categorical exclusions,
and the court may only reject that interpretation when it is unreasonable,
plainly erroneous, or inconsistent with the exclusion’s plain meaning.116
The Department of the Interior has designated the BIA’s approval of
mineral lease adjustments and transfers, including assignments and
subleases, as a categorical exclusion.117 In determining its own approval of
the Chaparral lease fell within the exclusion, the BIA necessarily
interpreted the term “lease transfer” as including the initial transfer of a
lease from a lessor to a lessee.118 Plaintiff asserts the exclusion only
applies to adjusting or transferring existing leases, not executing new

115
Id. at *4 (citing Citizens’ Comm. to Save Our Canyons v. U.S. Forest Serv., 297 F.3d
1012, 1023 (10th Cir. 2002)).
116
Id. (citing Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Bosworth, 443 F.3d 732, 735-36 (10th Cir. 2006)).
117
Id. (citing U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Bureau of Land Mgmt., Department Manual 516
DM 10.5(G)(3) (2004)).
118
Id.

126

leases.119 The BIA responds its interpretation is reasonable and is entitled
to controlling weight.120
First, the court looks to the categorical exclusion’s text in assessing
the parties’ positions.121 The exclusion covers the “approval of mineral
lease . . . transfers.”122 The language’s plain meaning precludes the BIA’s
interpretation.123 The term “lease” refers to the initial transfer of a
leasehold from a lessor to a lessee.124 Therefore, a lease “transfer”
necessarily denotes the transfer of rights under an existing lease from a
lessor or lessee to some third party.125 The BIA’s interpretation would
render the word “transfer” virtually meaningless, so it is incompatible with
the exclusion’s plain language.126
The court also looks to the language’s context.127 The term “lease
transfers” is not used in isolation, and the language refers to lease

Id.
Id.
121
Id. at *5.
122
Id. (quoting U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Bureau of Land Mgmt., Department Manual
516 DM 10.5(G)(3) (2004)).
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
119
120

127

“adjustments and transfers.”128 Because a lease must exist before it can be
adjusted, the text’s grouping of “adjustments and transfers” suggests the
provision was intended to apply to actions on existing leases.129
Second, the exclusion provision provides examples of a “lease
transfer:” assignments and subleases, which both refer to transfers of an
existing lease.130 Because both assignments and subleases share the basic
characteristic of existing leases, that further indicates the provision was
not meant to apply to a new lease’s creation.131
Third, the BIA’s interpretation of “lease transfer” requires reading
different language in two categorical exclusions as having the same
meaning.132 The BIA’s Department Manual includes another categorical
exclusion for approval of conveyances of interests in land where no
change in the land use is planned.133 If the BIA meant for “lease transfers”
Id.
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id. See Freeman v. Qucken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034, 2042 (2012) (“[T]he
commonsense canon of noscitur a sociis . . . counsels that a word is given more precise
content by the neighboring words with which it is associated”). See also 2A Norman J.
Singer et al., SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:16 (7th ed. 2007) (“[W]hen
two or more words are grouped together, and ordinarily have a similar meaning, but are
not equally comprehensive, a general word is limited and qualified by a special word.”).
132
Hayes, 2016 WL 1254427, at *5.
133
Id. (citing U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Bureau of Land Mgmt., Department Manual 516
DM 10.5(I) (2004)).
128
129
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to include the initial transfer of a leasehold interest from lessor to lessee,
the language clearly indicates the BIA knew how to and could have done
so.134 The BIA’s use of different language in other exclusions strongly
suggests it intended different meanings for each exclusion.135 Therefore,
the BIA’s determination that its approval of the Chaparral lease fell within
a categorical exclusion was premised on a plainly erroneous legal
interpretation, making the approval arbitrary and capricious. 136 The lease
contract between Chaparral and the Osage Nation vested no property
interest in Chaparral because the regulations137 require valid approval
from the government for a lease contract to have legal effect.138
Plaintiff contends the 1979 Assessment was a broad, programmatic
assessment of Osage County’s oil and gas leasing program and is too
general to allow the BIA to issue the two site-specific drilling permits.139
Plaintiff also submits that there are relevant significant new circumstances,

Id.
Id.
136
Id. at *6.
137
25 C.F.R. § 226.34(a) (2014).
138
Hayes, 2016 WL 1254427, at *5. An agency’s failure to comply with NEPA renders
the agency action at issue invalid. Sangre de Cristo Dev. Co., 932 F.2d 891, 894 (10th
Cir. 1991).
139
Hayes, 2016 WL 1254427, at *6.
134
135

129

so the BIA’s reliance on the Assessment was arbitrary and capricious. 140
In response, the government argues the 1979 Assessment addressed all
current and anticipated drilling in Osage County, so it automatically
covers the BIA’s approval of the Chaparral drilling permits.141
Alternatively, the government submits any violation on its part was trivial
and harmless.142
First, the Department of the Interior and the BIA are permitted to
use an existing Environmental Assessment in its entirety if either entity
determines the Assessment adequately appraises the environmental effects
of the proposed action and reasonable alternatives.143 The BIA’s approval
of a drilling permit is an agency action requiring, at a minimum,
preparation of an Environmental Assessment.144 The 1979 Assessment is a
broad, programmatic document meant to describe and evaluate all aspects
of the oil and gas leasing program in Osage County as it is supervised
under existing BIA regulations.145 The Assessment does not specifically
address the environmental impact of BIA approval of the two Chaparral
Id. at *9.
Id. at *7.
142
Id.
143
Id. at *7 (citing 43 C.F.R. § 46.120(c) (2014)).
144
Id.
145
Id.
140
141
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drilling permits.146 Applicable Department of the Interior regulations
require the BIA to make an explicit determination with supporting
documentation that the BIA believes the 1979 Assessment sufficiently
covers such drilling permit approval so as to obviate the need for a new
Assessment.147 Particularly, the supporting record must include an
evaluation of whether new circumstances, information, or changes in the
action or its impacts not previously analyzed may result in significantly
different environmental effects.148 Here, the BIA did not follow these
procedures or make any effort to explicitly incorporate, tier to, or adopt
the 1979 Assessment’s analysis.149 Therefore, the court held the BIA
failed to comply with NEPA.150
The government’s argument that a programmatic Environmental
Assessment

automatically covers

all

site-specific

agency

action

subsequently taken in furtherance of the program was unpersuasive.151 The
government relied on a statement from the Tenth Circuit that neither
NEPA nor the Council on Environmental Quality regulations require an
Id.
Id. (citing 43 C.F.R. §§ 46.120(c), 46.300 (2014)).
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id.
146
147
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agency to include a site-specific analysis for every particular area a
proposed action affects.152 The court deemed the government’s reliance on
that statement misplaced because the proposed action in that case was a
broad administrative action, and the action in this case was site-specific.153
There, the Tenth Circuit did not hold a site-specific analysis is never
required under NEPA or that somehow a programmatic Environmental
Assessment

automatically covers

all

site-specific

agency

action

subsequently taken in furtherance of a relevant program. 154 That case and
its holding are irrelevant to the site-specific agency action at issue here
because this case involves a broad action followed by a narrower, related
action.155
Here, the broad action is the BIA’s adoption of an oil and gas
leasing program in Osage County, and the subsequent approval of the
Chaparral drilling permits is the narrow action.156 Applying the Tenth
Circuit’s holding, the BIA’s 1979 Assessment for the oil and gas leasing
program does not need to include a site-specific analysis of every area the
Id. (citing Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 661 F.3d 1209 (10th Cir. 2011)).
Id. NEPA does not require that agencies prepare a site-specific analysis for every
specific location affected by a broad administrative action. Wyoming, 661 F.3d at 1255.
154
Hayes, 2016 WL 1254427, at *7.
155
Id. at *8.
156
Id.
152
153
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oil and gas leasing program affects.157 This application does not indicate
the Assessment automatically covers all site-specific drilling permits
issued as part of the broader leasing program. 158 Such a holding would
plainly disregard applicable regulations and circuit precedent. 159 Relying
on a broad, programmatic Assessment to support site-specific agency
action seeks to obtain the benefits of a categorical exclusion without going
through the notice and comment procedures necessary to promulgate a
categorical exclusion.160
The government contends any NEPA violation on its part was
trivial and harmless error.161 Neither NEPA nor the APA requires reversal
for trivial errors, but here the error was not harmless.162 Here, the BIA has
not gathered and documented information concerning the environmental
impacts of its actions.163 Even before the court, the BIA did not provide

Id.
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id. at*8 n.4.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id. See Lee v. U.S. Air Force, 354 F.3d 1229, 1237 (10th Cir. 2004).
157
158
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any supporting documentation to show the 1979 Assessment adequately
covers its approval of the two Chaparral drilling permits.164
The BIA’s approval of the two drilling permits required, at a
minimum, for the BIA to either prepare a new Environmental Assessment
or determine the 1979 Assessment adequately appraised the proposed
action’s environmental effects with supporting documentation.165 The BIA
did not do either, and failure to do so was a material violation of NEPA.166
Reviewing an agency’s decision not to prepare a supplemental
Environmental Assessment is a two-step inquiry.167 First, the court
addresses whether the agency took a “hard look” at the new information to
determine whether supplemental analysis is necessary.168 Second, if the
court determines the agency took the requisite “hard look,” then the court
reviews the agency’s decision not to issue a supplemental Environmental
Assessment under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard.169
Plaintiff contends the 1979 Assessment requires supplementation
because there have been significant legal and technological changes since
Hayes, 2016 WL 125447, at *8 n.4.
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id. at *9.
168
Id. (quoting S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Norton 301 F.3d 1217, 1238 (10th Cir. 2002)).
169
Id.
164
165
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1979 relevant to the environmental impacts of drilling in Osage County,
especially in regards to fracking’s growth and development.170 Plaintiff
presents evidence that today, many well completions in Osage County
involve fracking, unlike 1979, and the fracking involves much more fluid
driven by significantly more horsepower than in 1979.171 Given these
changes, Plaintiff contends the BIA’s reliance on the 1979 Assessment to
support its approval of the two drilling permits was arbitrary and
capricious.172
Neither the administrative record nor the parties’ briefs contain any
indication the BIA actually considered whether the 1979 Assessment
requires supplementation.173 Even though the BIA states it made this
determination prior to approving the Chaparral drilling permits, there is
nothing in the record to support that assertion.174 But even if the BIA had
made that determination, neither the record nor the government’s brief
contains any explanation for such a decision.175 Therefore, the court

Id.
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id. at *10.
174
Id.
175
Id.
170
171

135

cannot say that the BIA took the requisite “hard look” at new information
to assess whether supplementation might be necessary.176
Even if the BIA had consciously determined supplementation was
unnecessary, that determination was arbitrary and capricious. 177 The 1979
Assessment does not contain any discussion of the environmental impacts
of fracking.178 The Assessment merely notes fracking technology exists
and is in its experimental stages.179 Today, numerous wells in Osage
County involve fracking, and the systems, technology, and chemical
completion fluids used in such operations have changed dramatically.180
The government cannot reasonably contend these changes are insignificant
or irrelevant to the environmental impacts of drilling operations in Osage
County.181 The government’s reliance on the 1979 Assessment without
supplementation was arbitrary and capricious.182

Id. (citing Norton v. S. Alliance Utah, 542 U.S. 55, 73 (2004)).
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Id.
176
177
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BIA’s approval of the two drilling permits violated NEPA for two
independent reasons.183 First, the BIA did not prepare a new
Environmental Assessment for the action, and it did not follow the
procedures necessary to rely on the 1979 Assessment.184 Second, even if
the BIA had followed the proper procedures, its reliance on the 1979
Assessment without supplementation was arbitrary and capricious.185
BIA’s approval of the Chaparral lease and two drilling permits failed to
comply with NEPA.186 Therefore, the lease and drilling permits have no
legal effect.187
V. COMMENT
A.
What kind of Environmental Impact Statement or
Environmental Assessment is Appropriate?
Hayes is the first of its kind to invalidate a federal oil lease and
drilling permits approved by the BIA because of failure to comply with
NEPA. The court’s decision to invalidate the leases fits within NEPA
jurisprudence and reviews the BIA’s determination that an Environmental

Id.
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id. at *11.
187
Id.
183
184
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Assessment from 1979 sufficiently covered a proposed oil lease and
drilling project. In the case at bar, the decision is appropriate given the
substantial growth in fracking drilling methods since 1979. While this
particular situation would rarely occur again in the future (presumably the
BIA would not make this same determination again), courts require
agencies to pay close attention to when external circumstances have
changed so much as to require supplementation or more recent
Environmental Assessments.188 In the future, it may be difficult for
agencies to tell when such external circumstances have changed to that
degree to be “significant” before a judge makes such a finding.189
Cf. Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989) (when reviewing an
agency decision not to supplement an Environmental Impact Statement, courts should
carefully review the record and the agency’s decision based on the agency’s evaluation of
the significance of the new information).
189
See generally Coker v. Skidmore, 941 F.2d 1306, 1311 n.7 (citing 40 C.F.R. §
1508.27 (2014)). CEQ regulations define “significant” in relevant part requiring
consideration of both context and intensity. Id. “Context” means an action’s significance
must be analyzed in several contexts such as society as a whole, the affected region, the
affected interests, and the locality. Id. Significance varies with the setting of the proposed
action. Id. “Intensity” refers to the severity of impact. Id. The following should be
considered when evaluating intensity: (1) Impacts that may be both beneficial and
adverse. Id. A significant effect may exist if the Federal agency believes that on balance
the effect will be beneficial; (2) The degree to which the proposed action affects public
health or safety; (3) Unique characteristics of the geographic area such as proximity to
historic or cultural resources, park lands, prime farmlands, wetlands, wild and scenic
rivers, or ecologically critical areas; (4) The degree to which the effects on the quality of
the human environment are likely to be highly controversial; (5) The degree to which the
effects on the quality of the human environment are likely to be highly uncertain or
involve unique or unknown risks . . . (9) The degree to which the action may adversely
188

138

An environmental assessment being merely outdated is not enough
to make an agency’s reliance on one arbitrary and capricious. 190 A judge
must also make a finding that a change in circumstances makes reliance on
the Assessment arbitrary and capricious.191 Regulations and cases from
other districts should have indicated to the BIA such findings are possible.
Sometimes agencies are not aware of an action’s compliance or
noncompliance until they find themselves in court.192 However, both
agencies and the public benefit from informed decision making about the
environmental impacts of agencies’ programs and specific actions.
In the past, there has been some uncertainty as to when sitespecific Environmental Impact Statements are required. Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statements serve as generic rules that can resolve
sets of issues for purposes of case-specific Environmental Impact
Statements.193 S. Utah Wilderness Alliance directs courts to first ask

affect an endangered or threatened species or its habitat . . . (10) whether the action
threatens a violation of Federal, State, or local law. Id.
190
Id. at 1310.
191
Id.
192
See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Gover, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1197 (D. S.D. 2000),
vacated on other grounds.
193
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 100-01 (1983)
(citing Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,
535 n.13 (1978)).
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whether there is an ongoing action that invites supplementation. This is a
fact-specific inquiry dependent on the surrounding conditions. In one case,
the court found no site-specific analysis was necessary because no specific
plans had yet been submitted.194 In another case, the court rejected that the
agency should have prepared a site-specific Environmental Assessment
instead of a broad Environmental Assessment leaving consideration of
site-specific effects to later Assessments or Impact Statements.195
Specifying the proper scope of an Environmental Impact Statement has
been one of the most difficult questions for courts, and the form of action,
details, functions, and facts have been considered in each case.196
Challenging the BIA’s broad oil and gas leasing program is
improper. Two Plaintiffs brought an action on their own behalf and on
behalf of all surface owners and lessees in Osage County against the
United States through the BIA and against Chaparral, among others.197

Def. of Wildlife v. Hall, 807 F. Supp. 2d 972, 980 (D. Mont. 2011) (no wolf removal
plans had been submitted, and the agency properly concluded the wolf removal would not
disrupt ecosystem functions or impact other species).
195
High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 848 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1058 (N.D.
Cal. 2012).
196
William H. Rodgers, Jr., National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)—When—
Statement timing—Supplemental EISs—Programmatic EISs—Examples from Indian
Country, ENVT. L. INDIAN COUNTRY § 1:23 (2015).
197
Donelson v. U.S., 2016 WL 1301169, at *1 (N.D. Okla. 2016). Plaintiffs do not
194
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Plaintiffs asserted under the APA and NEPA that since the 1979
Assessment was prepared, there have been significant changes in relevant
environmental laws, regulations, and drilling processes.198 Plaintiffs also
alleged the Superintendent’s failure to evaluate environmental impacts
prior to lease approval renders the oil and gas leases void ab initio,
identifying about 20,000 active wells in the class area.199 In response, the
Defendants contended because the Plaintiffs do not challenge any
particular agency action, instead the entire oil leasing program, the
allegations are insufficient to confer jurisdiction under the APA.200 Courts
can intervene only when a specific final agency action has an actual or
immediately threatened effect.201 The District Court for the Northern

include Hayes. On July 15, 2014, Robin Phillips, Superintendent for the Osage Agency,
sent a letter to all lessees advising that all applications for permits to drill will require
Environmental Assessments in the future as the result of another lawsuit in the same
district. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 13, Hayes v. Chaparral
Energy, LLC, 2016 WL 1254427 (N.D. Okla. 2016).
198
Donelson, 2016 WL 1301169, at *2.
199
Id. Plaintiffs also asked the court to take judicial notice of the United States’ filings in
U.S. v. Osage Wind, LLC, 2015 WL 5775378 (N.D. Okla. 2015), in which the US
acknowledged its fiduciary duty to protect the Osage Mineral Estate. Donelson, 2016 WL
1301169, at *6.
200
Id. at *4. Programmatic improvement to agency programs are properly sought in the
executive or legislative branches of government, unless Congress has created an
appropriate exception. Id. (citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 891
(1990)).
201
Id. (quoting Lujan, 497 U.S. at 894). Prohibition also applies to an agency’s alleged
failure to act. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2012).
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District of Oklahoma found against Plaintiffs because they challenged
thousands of unspecified leases and drilling permits and did not identify
even one particular agency action for challenge, precedent plainly
prohibited the suit.202
Additionally, the age of Environmental Assessments and Impact
Statements can lead to hasty generalizations. Outdated Environmental
Assessments or Impact Statements alone are not sufficient for NEPA
noncompliance.203 In Coker, the Southern District of Mississippi held a
fifteen year old Impact Statement for an entire flood control project could
not serve as the basis for compliance with NEPA, and a supplemental
Impact Statement was required.204 There, the Corps admitted the Impact
Statement was outdated and ordered a supplemental Impact Statement
because the river flowline may have changed.205 The court held an
Environmental Impact Statement can become so outdated that it can no
longer provide foundation for a subpart to be tiered to. 206 The Corps’
decision not to supplement the Environmental Impact Statement was
202
Donelson, 2016 WL 1301169, at *4. Federal Defendants have sovereign immunity
from Plaintiffs’ alleged programmatic NEPA violations. Id. at *5 n.2.
203
Coker v. Skidmore, 941 F.2d 1306, 1310 (5th Cir. 1991).
204
Coker v. Skidmore, 744 F. Supp. 121, 121 (S.D. Miss. 1990).
205
Id. at 124-25.
206
Id. at 125.
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arbitrary and capricious.207 However, Council on Environmental Quality
regulations do not directly address whether an Environmental Impact
Statement can become outdated.208
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held the Corps was not required to
prepare a supplemental Impact Statement without a finding that there were
significant new circumstances relevant to environmental concerns and
bearing on the proposed action or its impacts.209 The proper inquiry was
whether the Impact Statement was insufficient so as to require the
preparation of a supplemental Impact Statement before the specific project
(construction of a levee).210 The District Court erred in holding the Corps’
decision not to supplement the Impact Statement was arbitrary and
capricious.211 A court may only order preparation of a supplemental
Impact Statement if there are significant new circumstances relevant to
environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its
impacts.212 Instead of remanding for further findings, the Fifth Circuit
concluded since the District Court agreed with the Corps that there was no
Id.
Id.
209
Coker v. Skidmore, 941 F.2d 1306, 1310 (5th Cir. 1991).
210
Id. at 1309. The specific project was construction of a levee. Id. at 1310.
211
Id.
212
Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(ii) (2014) and 33 C.F.R. § 230.11 (2014)).
207
208
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evidence the levee itself would cause a significant environmental impact,
there was no regulatory requirement for a supplemental Impact
Statement.213
Sometimes aged Impact Statements are acceptable. The Fifth
Circuit perceived tiering regulations allow for gaps in time between
programmatic

Impact

Statements

and site-specific

Environmental

Assessments and focused on the site-specific project’s impacts.214 Other
districts have followed the Fifth Circuit’s approach.215 Hayes did not
actually allege the 1979 Environmental Assessment was outdated.216
Rather, Hayes alleged there had been significant changes in drilling
technology that were not considered in the 1979 Assessment, specifically
increased fracking within Osage County.217 Hayes does not conflict with
the Fifth Circuit’s view.
Id. at 1307.
Mark T. Story, Environmental Law, 24 TEX. TECH L. REV. 271 (1993).
215
See Becker v. Fed. R.R. Admin., 999 F. Supp. 240 (D. Conn. 1996) (Plaintiffs failed
to show the original proposed action substantially changed or there were significant new
circumstances or information relevant to the project and its environmental impact where a
change of forty minutes in the projected train running time altered the project. Plaintiffs
failed to note the mere age of an [Environmental Impact Statement] is not grounds for
invalidation). See also Lone Tree Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 2007 WL
1520904 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
216
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Hayes v. Chaparral, (No. 14-CV495-GKF-PJC), 2016 WL 51254427.
217
Id.
213
214
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Agencies do not need to supplement Impact Statements every time
new information comes to light after the Impact Statement is finalized.218
However, agencies have a continuing duty to supplement their Impact
Statements, and agencies must supplement when there are significant new
circumstances relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the
proposed actions or its impacts. In future cases, reviewing an agency’s
evaluation of the new circumstances may not be so easy, and the
significance of new facts and circumstances may be difficult for agencies
themselves to evaluate. Guidance on whether a particular new
circumstance is “significant” is not particularly helpful to courts or
agencies. New circumstances are significant where “new information
provides a seriously different picture of the environmental landscape.”219
So any given new fact may or may not be significant, depending on
whether the agency perceives a particular new circumstance provides a
seriously different picture of the environmental landscape and whether the
agency’s decision about that new circumstance was arbitrary and
capricious.

218
219

Marsh v. Or. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989).
City of Olmsted Falls, OH v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 274 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

145

B.
Tribes?

Why are Government Lease Approvals So Important to

In a case similar to Hayes involving BIA lease approval, the lease
agreement was for a hog production facility on tribal trust land in Mellette
County, South Dakota.220 The Assistant Secretary of the BIA sent a letter
to the tribe stating the Area Director’s lease approval for the project was
void for failure to comply with NEPA.221 However, the Assistant
Secretary was not aware of the lease’s noncompliance with NEPA until
environmentalists and neighbors brought suit.222 The tribe and the
company sought a temporary restraining order barring BIA action, and the
court agreed with the Assistant Secretary that NEPA requirements likely
had not been met.223 The District Court for the District of South Dakota
disagreed with the Assistant Secretary’s methods because the conclusory
letter did not offer analysis or explanation why the Assessment had been
inadequate, and the letter had been sent four to five months after the
Assistant Secretary learned of the NEPA violations.224 The court
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Gover, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1197 (D. S.D. 2000).
Id.
222
Id. at 1206.
223
Id. at 1202.
224
Id. at 1206. “It’s high time . . . the BIA conducts its affairs in a timely and businesslike manner to give confidence to Tribes, all Native Americans, their business partners,
220
221

146

concluded the BIA had taken a hard look and an Environmental Impact
Statement was not required because of the alternatives’ narrow scope,225
high controversy, or inadequate investigation of historic and cultural
properties.226
NEPA competence within the BIA would have helped, and the
project should have been more thoroughly studied, evaluated, and
permitted before it was rushed ahead.227 Later, newly elected Tribal
Council decided they wanted the Assistant Secretary’s voiding of the lease
approval upheld and entered into a land return agreement, continuing to
lease only a fraction of what had previously been leased.228 Afterwards,
management changed on the leased lands as well.229
Further, tribes, individuals, and development companies are
concerned with timely agency action. Courts may compel the agency to
and lending institutions so that they can rely upon the BIA to do what they say they are
going to do. The principles of equity dictate that the Assistant Secretary’s decision cannot
be upheld.” Id.
225
Id. Private corporations are not required to consider alternatives that are not in their
economic interest. Id. at 1209.
226
Id. at 1213.
227
William H Rodgers, Jr. & Elizabeth Burleson, National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) – Whether an EIS is Required – Major Actions and Significant Effects –
Thresholds in Indian Country, Envt. L. Indian Country § 1:19 (2015).
228
Vi Waln, Sun Prairie to Allow Ag Systems to Operate Hog Farm, LAKOTA COUNTRY
TIMES (Aug. 25, 2009), http://www.lakotacountrytimes.com/news/2009-0825/front_page/002.html.
229
Id.
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act, but they cannot specify what the action must be.230 In a case about the
government’s alleged failure to approve drilling permits, Hayes failed to
plead facts tying the dispute to his property. Plaintiff, Osage Producers
Association, brought an action pursuant to the APA against several
government Defendants, alleging the government had unreasonably
delayed issuing drilling permits, tacitly denying each and every permit
pending before the Superintendent.231 Plaintiff’s complaint sought to
compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,
processing pending drilling permits.232 The District Court for the Northern
District of Oklahoma held Hayes’ claimed interest of ensuring NEPA
compliance on his land was not related to the subject of this action
because the present litigation could not impair or impede his interest,
regardless of the outcome, because the government must comply with
NEPA.233
Leases are an income source for tribes because of royalties, but
further complications arise when fracking is involved. The federal
Osage Producers Ass’n v. Jewell, 2016 WL 80660, at *2 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 30, 2010)
(quoting Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004)).
231
Id. at *1.
232
Id. at *2.
233
Id. at *3.
230
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government estimates ninety percent of wells drilled on federal and Indian
lands used fracking in 2013.234 Gas drillers’ operations involve hundreds
of truckloads and many hours of industrial operations, and there may be
accidental spills and fires along with odors, lighting, and noises at the
well.235 Rural roads are not designed for major industrial cargoes, which
may pose a serious threat to neighbors.236 Neighbors bear all of the burden
from fracking because the landowners will at least be compensated under
the leases’ terms.237 Neighbors can also expect night flaring of burning
gases and clouds of chemical dust.238
NEPA applies to several steps of the federal lands leasing process
and affects oil and gas development activities. However, Environmental
Impact Statements result in multilayer delays and multi-million dollar
costs.239 In one case concerning a well drilling, an oil and gas exploration
company filed an application and permit to drill with the agency, and the

Rita Ann Cicero, Feds ask 10th Circuit to Expedite Fracking Review, 36 No. 16
WESTLAW J. ENVTL. 10, at *1 (Mar. 2, 2016).
235
James T. O’Reilly, Litigation About Fracking Wells & Waste, The Law of Fracking §
14:15 (Sept. 2015).
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Id.
239
Timothy M. Miller, et. al., Leasing Federal Oil and Gas, 32 E. MIN. L. FOUND. §
14.06 (2011).
234
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agency completed an Environmental Assessment and issued a FONSI.240
Plaintiffs, two nonprofit organizations, alleged the agencies failed to
comply with NEPA in approving the drilling permit application.241 The
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held the agencies’
action was arbitrary and capricious.242 Years later, the agencies published
their notice of intent to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for the
drilling project.243 The agencies later published a revised notice of intent
years after that.244 Even later, the company withdrew the drilling permit
application, cancelling the project, making the need to prepare the Impact
Statement unnecessary.245 So, sometimes agencies will have wasted their
time and money when the lessee decides not to pursue its project.
Reform within the BIA is necessary to allow for timely and lawful
compliance among leases. However, courts are not equipped to address
this broad issue and can only address specific cases and controversies that
240

Anglers of Au Sable v. U.S. Forest Serv., 402 F. Supp. 2d 826, 829 (E.D. Mich.
2005).
241
Id. at 828.
242
Id. at 835.
243
Dep’t of Agric., Forest Service, Huron-Manistee National Forests, Michigan, USA
and State South Branch 1-8 Well, 75 Fed. Reg. 8297 (Feb. 24, 2010).
244
Dep’t of Agric., Forest Service, Huron-Manistee National Forests, Michigan, USA
and State South Branch 1-8 Well, 77 Fed. Reg. 1665 (Jan. 11, 2012).
245
Dep’t of Agric., Forest Service, Huron-Manistee National Forests, Michigan, USA
and State South Branch 1-8 Well, 77 Fed. Reg. 58807 (Sept. 24, 2012).
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arise. Congress or the Department of the Interior are better suited to
evaluate, revise, and implement BIA procedures for lease approvals, all
while being mindful that regulations require agencies to consider whether
there are significant new circumstances affecting their actions.
While this decision may disfavor the oil industry because of time
and resources spent on Environmental Assessments, tribes will likely not
be affected. Oil development companies will likely still be interested in
fracking, so incurring the costs of Environmental Assessments likely will
not deter them as long as the lease approval process is not too timeconsuming. As a result, tribes will still receive royalties.
C.

Department of the Interior Fracking Regulations

In 2012, the Department of the Interior proposed more stringent
fracking regulations in respect to chemical disclosure, well integrity,
formation integrity, and water management.246 The argument against more
regulations is that more regulations would require too much information
for an agency to review before promptly issuing an authorization.247

See L. Poe Leggette, et. al, Bureau of Land Management (BLM) Proposed Regulation
of Hydraulic Fracturing, FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI LLP, 33 E. MIN. L. FOUND. § 22.15
(2012).
247
Id.
246
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Depending on the well’s location, several permits may be required.248
Some commenters believe the cost of compliance with several sets of
regulation is far more than the cost of remediating rare cases where
fracking causes damage.249
In 2015, the District Court for the District of Wyoming issued a
preliminary injunction stopping implementation of the new fracking
regulations on all public and Indian lands.250 The court ruled the
Department of the Interior lacked authority from Congress to regulate nondiesel fracking on public lands.251 The trade associations argued the Safe
Drinking Water Act252 gives exclusive authority to regulate underground
injections to states and the EPA.253 The agency contended the regulations
merely supplement existing Department of the Interior requirements.254
The court found the agency’s argument unpersuasive because Congress

Id.
Id.
250
Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, No. 15-043, 2015 WL 5845145 (D. Wyo. Sept.
30, 2015).
251
Id.
252
42 U.S.C. § 300h (2012).
253
Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t. of the Int., 136 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1353–54 (D. Wyo. 2015),
vacated and remanded sub nom Wyoming v. Sierra Club, 15-8126, 2016 WL 3853806
(10th Cir. July 13, 2016).
254
Id.
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mostly exempted fracking from federal regulation, except when diesel fuel
is injected into the ground.255
The agency and six environmental groups appealed the district
court’s injunction.256 Appellants argued the injunction impairs the
agency’s ability to fulfill its statutory duty to ensure oil and gas operations
on federal and Indian lands are properly conducted.257 During the public
comment period after the rule was proposed, many of the 1.5 million
comments submitted either supported the rule or wanted it to be more
protective of the environment.258
D.

Post-Hayes

Post Hayes, the Osage Minerals Council (“Council”) filed a motion
to dismiss for failure to join a necessary and indispensable party. 259 Since
the Council is part of Osage Nation which possesses sovereign immunity,
the District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma held joinder was

255
Id. “Congress clearly expressed intent that non-diesel hydraulic fracturing be removed
from the realm of federal regulation, thereby lodging authority to regulate that authority
within the states and tribes.” Id.
256
Wyoming v. Jewell, Nos. 15-8126 and 15-8134, 2016 WL 680277, appellants’ joint
motion filed (10th Cir. Feb. 8, 2016).
257
Id. at *6.
258
Id.
259
Hayes v. Chaparral Energy, LLC, 14-CV-495-GKF-PJC, 2016 WL 1175238, at *1
(N.D. Okla. Mar. 23, 2016).
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not feasible and therefore not required.260 The Council’s presence was
unnecessary to accord complete relief among the existing parties: Hayes,
Chaparral, and the BIA,261 and the government had adequately represented
the Council’s interests.262 The government proposed a remedial alternative
to lessen or avoid prejudice to the Council, suggesting that the court
identify the legal error in the lease approval and remand the case to the
agency without voiding the lease.263
That remedy would be inconsistent with Sangre, which held the
invalid lease contract there vested no property interest in Sangre. 264 When
a lease requires agency approval to be legally operative and a court later
determines the agency approved a lease in violation of NEPA, that
determination necessarily invalidates the underlying lease unless or until
valid agency approval.265 Sangre made it clear that there is no meaningful
distinction between a ruling that the Superintendent’s lease approval
violates NEPA and a ruling declaring the lease invalid.266 The holding in
Id. at *2.
Id.
262
Id. at *3.
263
Id. at *5.
264
Sangre de Cristo Dev. Co. v. U.S., 932 F.2d 891, 894 (10th Cir. 1991).
265
Hayes, 2016 WL 1175238, at *10.
266
Id. at *6. As a result, the court modifies and clarifies its order to remand the case to
260
261
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Hayes that the Environmental Assessment is inadequate does not
necessarily result in prejudice to the Council because the only result will
be a new Assessment for the Superintendent to consider, which does not
call for any action by or against the Council.267 Chaparral and the Council
still may obtain valid agency approval.268 Dismissal would insulate an
entire category of agency action from judicial review, precluding review
of the Superintendent’s oil and gas lease approval and drilling permits, so
the court would not dismiss for failure to join the Council.269
Then, the court amended its opinion so the lease and drilling
permits are no longer void ab initio, they are invalid instead. Hayes did
not declare the lease permanently invalid; it merely determined that a
condition precedent, the Superintendent’s valid lease approval, had not
been performed. As a result, the lease had no legal effect.270 Void ab initio
would foreclose some equitable remedies, which is one reason the Council
the agency for further administrative proceedings. Id. at *11 n.6.
267
Id. at *9.
268
Id. At one point the Council suggested it could sue the BIA for damages, but
sovereign immunity would bar such litigation. Id. at *11 n.3. Additionally, Chaparral has
since filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and sold its leases to Warrior Exploration &
Production, LLC (“Warrior”). Opening Brief for Intervenor Defendant-Appellant at *9,
Hayes v. Osage Minerals, (No. 16-5060), 2016 WL 5407598, at *9. However, Warrior
and the Council may still obtain valid agency approval.
269
Id. at *11.
270
Id. at *3, 6.
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made the motion to intervene as an indispensable party. 271 The court did
not mean to suggest the lease was permanently invalid.272 Use of the term
“invalid” fits more closely with all the opinions considered in this case
note, including Sangre. Further, the complaint itself seeks a declaratory
judgment that the lease and drilling permit are invalid so as to support a
trespass claim.273 The court remands the case for further agency
proceedings, which is consistent with Hillsdale.
V. CONCLUSION
While the costs of agency compliance with NEPA are high,
Congress intended agency compliance when it enacted NEPA because the
public generally benefits from informed decision-making. The BIA should
shoulder the costs of compliance or require lessees to do so,274 but

Judge Frizzell’s determination that the Council was not an indispensable party will be
reviewed for an abuse of discretion, meaning there is only a limited chance the Tenth
Circuit will reverse the order.
272
Id. at *11 n.6.
273
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Hayes v. Chaparral at 1, (No. 14CV-495-GKF-PJC), 2016 WL 54212. Although it also asks that the oil and gas leases be
voided ab initio elsewhere. See generally id. The complaint also seeks compensatory
damages, so the Tenth Circuit should not be persuaded by the Council’s argument that
Hayes’ claims are moot because Hayes may still obtain compensatory damages from
Chaparral’s bankruptcy estate. See generally First Amended Complaint for Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief (Dkt. No. 2) at 12, Hayes v. Chaparral Energy, LLC, -- F. Supp. 3d
– (2016) (Case No. 14-CV-495-GKF-PJC), 2016 WL 1254427.
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Assessment, so the lessees pay for Assessments. See 40 C.F.R. § 1506.5(b) (2014). Then
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remedial measures should be taken to ensure BIA competency and
efficiency because tribes may be relying on the royalties from the leases.
Tribes often do not want to delay the process because delay could possibly
cause development companies to lose interest. Because most fracking
regulation is left to the states, the least agencies can do is prepare or
approve lessee-prepared Assessments for lease approvals and drilling
permits when the circumstances so require. Normally, agencies are in the
best position to evaluate when external circumstances have changed
sufficiently from past Assessments, not courts. Hayes and Rosebud Sioux
Tribe are extraordinary cases of BIA noncompliance with NEPA.275 The
BIA’s internal procedures may need to be reworked internally or by the
Department of the Interior to avoid NEPA compliance problems with lease
approvals in the future without taking a substantially longer time. Parties
will want to avoid the time-consuming and monetary costs of litigation
ERIKA DOPUCH

like this one.

the BIA makes a FONSI or a Finding of Significant Impact. See generally Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Hayes v. Chaparral (No. 14-CV-495-GKF-PJC), 2016
WL 54212.
275
Plenty of Notices of Intent to Prepare Environmental Impact Statements, Draft
Environmental Statements, and Final Environmental Statements are available for viewing
and comment in the Federal Register. See generally
https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/indian-affairs-bureau.
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